Psicothema was founded in Asturias (northern Spain) in 1989, and is published jointly by the Psychology Faculty of the University of Oviedo and the Psychological Association of the Principality of Asturias (Colegio Oficial de Psicología del Principado de Asturias).
We currently publish four issues per year, which accounts for some 100 articles annually. We admit work from both the basic and applied research fields, and from all areas of Psychology, all manuscripts being anonymously reviewed prior to publication.
Psicothema, 2009. Vol. Vol. 21 (nº 4). 622-627
Henry Borja, Idaly Barreto, Mónica Alzate*, José Manuel Sabucedo* y Wilson López López**
Universidad Católica de Colombia, * Universidad de Santiago de Compostela y ** Pontificia Universidad Javeriana
El objetivo de este estudio es comprobar, en un contexto político real, si el paso de una situación de violencia política a un proceso de paz real exige el cambio de las creencias que hasta ese momento estaban al servicio del enfrentamiento. Se plantean dos hipótesis: a) si esas creencias no se modifican será difícil alcanzar un clima de confianza entre las partes y el proceso fracasará, y b) si eso sucede los grupos generarán creencias más extremas contra el adversario. Los resultados obtenidos mediante el análisis textual respaldan ese planteamiento. Durante el proceso de paz fallido no se modificó la estrategia de deslegitimación del oponente ni las identidades enfrentadas; y una vez que el proceso fracasó se le atribuyó la responsabilidad exclusivamente al adversario, al tiempo que se intensificó la deslegitimación del mismo.
Beliefs about the adversary, political violence and peace processes. The aim of this study is to test in a real political context whether or not a change in the beliefs which were fuelling the political violence in question is required during the advent of a peace process. Two hypothesis are considered: a) in the case of these beliefs not being modified, there will be difficulties to reach an atmosphere of trust between both parts and the process will fail, and b) if this happens, the groups will develop more extreme beliefs against the opponent. The results obtained through a textual analysis support both hypotheses. During the failure of the peace process, neither the strategy of the delegitimization of the opponent nor the identities in conflict were modified. Consequently, when the process failed, responsibility for this failure was attributed to the opponent, and, at the same time, delegitimization against the opponent intensified.